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As for writing, I still write -  at age 72. My experience is 
that I have to strive harder, tire sooner and come apart 
at the seams more completely than was the case when 
1 was younger. The aging mind has a bagful of nasty 
tTicks, one of which is to tuck names and words away in 
crannies where they are not immediately available and 
where I can’t always find them (E. B. White in Taylor, 
1984, p. 113).
There is often a mysterious growth of the mind, which 
we can trace to no particular efforts or studies, which 
we can hardly define, though we are conscious of it. We 
understand ourselves and the past, and our friends and 
the world better (Channing as cited in Tavlor, 1984, 
p. 102).
These two quotations illustrate the tension that 
exists in the literature regarding age-related differ­
ences in intelligence across adulthood. The view 
that intelligence largely declines in adulthood has 
perhaps received the longest and most overwhelm­
ing support. Intelligence during adulthood is char­
acterized by declines in the speed of mental pro­
cesses, in abstract reasoning, and in several measures 
of memory performance (see Salthouse, 1991, for a 
review). However, much empirical and theoretical 
work characterizes adult intellectual development as 
being marked by progressive growth in the ability 
to integrate cognitive, interpersonal, and emotional 
thought so th at the type of synthetic understanding 
of self and others that Channing spoke of is possi­
ble (see Ubouvie-Vief, 1992, for a review). As will 
be seen throughout the chapter, in a life-span the­
oretical perspective these two perspectives are not 
considered to be inconsistent, but rather the devel­
opm ent of intelligence is seen as a balance between
such losses and gains (Baltes, 1987; Labouvie-Vief, 
1992).
The question of what happens to adult intelli­
gence across the life span has sparked tremendous 
debate and controversy (see Baltes & Schaie, 1976; 
Horn & Donaldson, 1976; Schaie, 1974). Horn and 
Donaldson (1976) argued that intellectual decline 
is inevitable: “ if one lives long enough, decrement 
in at least some of the important abilities of intelli­
gence is likely to occur" (p. 701). Schaie (1974) re­
ferred to the view of declining adult intelligence as 
"at best a methodological artifact and at worst a 
popular misunderstanding of the relation between 
individual development and sociocultural change" 
(p. 802). As highlighted by Horn's focus on "impor­
tant abilities," at least part of the controversy over 
adult intelligence as decline versus maintenance 
and improvement arose over different conceptions 
about the nature of adult intelligence and about de­
velopment. Before reviewing the literature on adult 
intelligence, we must explore what is meant by in­
telligence and by development.
DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE 
AND DEVELOPMENT
Intelligence
Although a great deal of research in the field of 
adult intelligence has operated under the assump­
tion that adult intelligence is "what an intel­
ligence test measures," numerous theorists have 
raised concerns about using traditional intelligence 
tests to measure the intelligence of adults across the 
life span (Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984;
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Berg & Sternberg, 1985; Demming St Pressey, 1957; 
Labouvie-Vief, 1992). Intelligence tests were origi­
nally designed to predict the academic success of 
children; however, such prediction is not relevant 
to older adults who are typically outside of the aca­
demic environment. Many theoreticians have de­
scribed a different nature of intelligence across the 
life span (e.g., Labouvie-Vief, 1992) in which "do­
mains of psychological functioning other than per­
formance on intelligence tests gain in relative sig­
nificance" (Baltes et al., 1984, p. 50). The focus in 
adulthood is on domains such as family life, health, 
personal and professional development, and social 
intelligence rather than school.
In this chapter, the term intelligence will be used 
to refer to the mental abilities and processes involved in 
providing on optimal fit between oneself and one's en­
vironment. This definition of intelligence has a long­
standing history in the field of intellectual develop­
ment. The view of intelligence as adaptation is the 
key to Piaget's notion of intelligence (1976) and has 
been present in many contextually based notions 
of intelligence (Berg & Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg, 
1985). This view of intelligence makes apparent two 
aspects in the expression of intelligence: abilities and 
mental processes that lie within the individual and how 
these abilities and mental processes transact the con­
straints and opportunities o f  the context. Thus, intel­
ligence does not reside solely within an individ­
ual's mind but in how an individual uses abilities 
and mental processes to transact with, adapt to, and 
shape his or her environment.
This view of intelligence is apparent in numer­
ous theoretical positions on adult development and 
aging. For instance, the triarchic theory of intelli­
gence proposed by Sternberg (1985) and extended to 
adult development and aging by Berg and Sternberg 
(1985) explicitly defines intelligence as residing in 
an interaction between the individual's abilities and 
processes and their expression within different con­
texts. Tn the triarchic theory, the context in which 
individuals must adapt may differ across adult de­
velopment in terms of the demands and constraints 
that are present (e.g., shift out of the work context 
as a resuit of retirement). As these contexts shift 
across the life span, the abilities and processes neces­
sary for successful adaptation may vary at different 
developmental epochs. Berg and Steinberg (1992) 
found through an examination of adults' concep­
tions of intelligence that adults perceived the abil­
ities needed for successful adaptation as differing 
in importance across adulthood. Adults perceived 
intelligence to consist of three distinct subabilities 
(i.e., interest in, and ability to deal with, novelty; 
verbal ability; and everyday competencies) whose 
importance to the assessment of intelligence dif­
fered across development. For instance, character­
istics associated with the interest in, and ability to 
deal with, novelty were perceived to be most impor­
tant for young adults and less important for middle- 
aged and older adults, whereas characteristics associ­
ated with everyday competencies and verbal ability 
were considered to be more important for middle- 
aged and older adults than young adults.
P. B. Baltes and M. M. Baltes' (1990; see also Baltes 
et al., 1998) notion of selective optimization with 
compensation also focuses on the interplay between 
the individual and context. Individuals are posited 
to select across the life span from a variety of do­
mains and goal possibilities those that can be en­
hanced and correspondingly to compensate for abil­
ities and processes that may be showing elements of 
decline. Thus, individuals are thought to actively se­
lect out of some contexts and into others that can 
maximize their strengths and minimize their weak­
nesses in abilities and processes. For instance, older 
adults seem to leave jobs that require quick sensori­
motor performance (Barrett, Mihal, Panek, Sterns, & 
Alexander, 1977), perhaps because they are selecting 
into other work environments that may rely less on 
their declining speed of performance. In addition, 
older adults report that they attempt to optimize 
and compensate at work through impression man­
agement {Abraham & Hansson, 1995). Many cur­
rent theories of life-span development include this 
self-regulatory notion of intellectual development 
(Backman & Dixon, 1992; Brandtstadter & Greve, 
1994; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995) in which indi­
viduals regulate their own fit to changing contexts.
V IE W  OF D EVE LO PM E N T
The view of development adopted in this chapter is 
a life-span developmental perspective (Baltes, 1987; 
Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998). As out­
lined by Baltes (1987, Baltes et al,, 1998), this per­
spective views development as an expression of both 
ontogenetic, and cultural and historical changes. The
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life-span developmental perspective again points to 
the importance of examining individual intellectual 
development as situated within, and in comparison 
across, the contexts in which it is expressed.
An important methodological issue within the 
field of life-span development, the influence of co­
hort effects, illustrates how an individual's intellec­
tual development is situated within his or her histor­
ical context. Cohort effects were revealed by Schaie
(1984) to be an important factor in understanding 
cross-sectional differences in intellectual develop­
ment. That is, cross-sectional methods for examin­
ing intellectual development in which individuals 
of different ages are compared at one point in time 
confound age and cohort (generational member­
ship or normative influences that are held in com­
mon with those in one’s birth cohort). A compar­
ison of age differences uncovered via a variety of 
methodological designs (e.g., cross-sectional, longi­
tudinal, cross-sequential) revealed that a substantial 
proportion of the age-related differences in intellec­
tual functioning could be accounted for by cohort 
effects. Thus, factors associated with historical time 
(e.g., years of education held by adults in different 
generations, generational differences in educational 
systems) were reflected in many of the differences 
that were thought to be representative of age differ­
ences in intellectual functioning.
Many of the tenets of life-span development are 
consonant with a view of intelligence as the indi­
vidual transacting his or her context (Baltes et a!„ 
1998). First, intellectual development is character­
ized by multidirectionality; that is, intelligence takes 
pluralistic forms across development (e.g., linear 
increase, maintenance, some decline, increase fol­
lowed by maintenance and then decline), depend­
ing on the ability in question and the context in 
which that ability is examined. Second, great in­
terindividual variability is posited to occur in life­
span development, in part due to aspects of the 
contexts that different individuals traverse across 
development. Third, great plasticity (within-person 
variability) is found in intellectual performance, 
depending on the supportive conditions present 
within the context.
This chapter will review theoretical and empirical 
work that illustrates the development of adult in­
telligence ( 1) in the mental abilities and processes 
that are thought to be important for adaptation and
(2 ) in how those mental abilities and processes vary 
as they are applied across different contexts. Instead 
of an exhaustive survey of the research oriented to­
ward individual abilities and processes situated in 
context, the review will provide illustrative research 
to support general principles of intellectual devel­
opment. The chapter ends with a call for research 
that integrates these aspects of adult intelligence 
and questions and issues for the future of the field 
of adult intellectual development.
Research drawn from three theoretical perspec­
tives will be used to review the existing literature on 
the development of adult intelligence: psychomet­
ric, information-processing, and contextual. These 
perspectives were chosen for two reasons: ( 1) be­
cause of their prominence in the field at the current 
time (see Berg k  Klaczynski, 1996; Schaie, 1996a; 
Sternberg & Berg, 1992) and (2) because of their em­
phasis on the abilities and processes individuals use 
to adapt to their life contexts. The psychometric and 
the information-processing approaches focus on the 
abilities and processes that reside within the "in­
dividual."The contextual approach focuses on how 
the expression of those individual abilities and pro­
cesses may vary, depending on the social and histor­
ical context in which intelligence is expressed. Al­
though the perspective taken in this chapter is that 
abilities and processes do not reside within the indi­
vidual but at the transaction of the individual and 
his or her context, the research literature has gener­
ally assumed that abilities and processes are within 
the head of the individual. Thus, the reader may ini­
tially get the impression that abilities and processes 
are a property of the individual that he or she applies 
in different contexts, which is not the perspective of 
this chapter. As will be seen in the concluding sec­
tion, intellectual development from the perspective 
advanced in the paper should be examined as the 
process whereby the individual transacts with his or 
her context.
INDIVIDUAL MENTAL ABILITIES 
AND PROCESSES
Abilities
In specifying the number and kinds of cate­
gories of mental abilities that characterize intellec­
tual development, the field has drawn heavily from 
work on the structure or nature of intelligence in
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psychometrics. The psychometric perspective de­
fines intelligence as those cognitive products that 
characterize intellectual differences between indi­
viduals at various developmental periods (Horn & 
Hofer, 1992; Schaie, 1996a). The field of adult intelli­
gence had been dominated by the psychometric per­
spective until the 1980s (see Schaie, 1996a; Schaie & 
Willis, 1996, for a complete treatment of the psycho­
metric perspective). This approach comes the closest 
to defining intelligence as "how well one scores on 
an intelligence test."
In the psychometric perspective, the nature of 
intelligence is first investigated by measuring the 
performance of individuals on specific intelligence 
tests. Statistical procedures are then utilized that 
summarize and illuminate the structure underly­
ing the organization of individuals' performance on 
these intelligence tests. Distinct abilities can be char­
acterized as those that do not cluster together and 
those that show different trajectories across devel­
opment. Although issues of the number and kinds 
of mental abilities characterizing intelligence were 
a matter of great dispute (see Reinert, 1970, for a 
review), a consensus has emerged that adult intelli-
FICURE 6.1. Examples of test Items from the Primary Mental 
Abilities Test (taken from schaie & Willis, 1996).
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gence consists of a small number (2- 12) of different 
components that remain largely unchanged in their 
organization across adult development (Horn & 
Hofer, 1992).
The following review will be restricted to three dif­
ferent abilities currently considered distinct in terms 
of their content and developmental trajectory: fluid 
intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and everyday 
intelligence (see Schaie & Willis, 1996). The psycho­
metric literaftire (see Baltes et al., 1998, for a re­
view) has uncovered that different abilities display 
different developmental functions (multidirection­
ality), that there is extensive variability in adult in­
telligence at any particular age (interindividual vari­
ability), and that there is great modifiability of adult 
intelligence (plasticity).
FLUID AND CRYSTALLIZED INTELLIGENCE.
One of the most robust and long-standing divisions 
of intelligence is the fluid and crystallized distinc­
tion of Cattell and Horn le.g., Cattell, 1971; Horn, 
1968). Fluid intelligence is said to be measured best 
by tasks that require adaptation to new situations 
and for which prior learning provides relatively lit­
tle advantage. Crystallized intelligence is best mea­
sured by tasks in which the problem solving of the 
task has been learned as a result of education and 
acculturation, or both. Measures of fluid 
intelligence include tests of abstract rea­
soning, spatial orientation, and perceptual 
speed, whereas measures of crystallized in­
telligence include tests of verbal ability such 
as vocabulary and arithmetic abilities (see 
Figure 6.1 for example items from the Pri­
mary Mental Abilities Test (PMA), the mea­
sure that has been most extensively investi­
gated by Schaie, 1996b).
1. MULTIDIRECTIONALITY OF INTEL­
LIGENCE. The multidirectionality of adult 
intelligence refers to the display of dif­
ferent developmental patterns by distinct 
abilities. Fluid intelligence has been de­
scribed by Horn and Hofer (1992) as abil­
ities that are vulnerable to aging. As can 
be seen in Figure 6 .2 , cross-sectional func­
tions of these two different types of abili­
ties are distinct, and cross-sectional declines 
are largest for measures of fluid intelligence.
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The developmental function of crystallized intel­
ligence is largely stable until the sixth decade of 
life with decline thereafter. The findings reported 
above are for cross-sectional studies of intellectual 
development. Longitudinal research (in which the 
same individuals are followed across time) suggests 
that even for fluid intelligence, decline does not be­
gin generally until between ages 60 and 70, whereas 
decline in crystallized intelligence occurs nearly a 
decade later after age 70 (Schaie, 1996b).
Because of these robust age-related differences in 
performance, much effort has been expended to try 
to explain the difference between these vulnerable 
and maintained abilities. The basic distinction be­
tween fluid and crystallized intelligence relies on 
the difference between abilities that are novel ver­
sus familiar and those that do not and do require 
the application of knowledge. Thus, the distinction 
has been interpreted as indicating differences in the 
ability to deal with novelty versus the ability to ap­
ply one's knowledge in relatively familiar settings. 
However, careful work that controls for the degree 
of task novelty for individuals across the Life span 
has not been conducted. Some theorists (Cattell, 
1963; Horn, 1968) have interpreted differences in
FIGURE 6.2. Cross-sectional age gradients In six primary men­
tal abilities (taken from Schaie. 1996).
the functions of fluid and crystallized intelligence 
as reflective of a stronger genetic base to fluid in­
telligence, although heritability estimates for both 
abilities are about equal (Nichols, 1978).
The differences in developmental function of 
fluid and crystallized intelligence may be due, in 
part, to generational gains in intelligence referred to 
as the Flynn effect (Flynn, 1987). Flynn demonstrated 
generational gains in intelligence (ranging from 5 
to 25 IQ points) across countries, and the largest 
gains occurred for tests of fluid intelligence rather 
than crystallized intelligence. Thus, cross-sectional 
decreases in fluid intelligence across age may not 
be attributable to declines in fluid intelligence in 
late life but to increases in the level of fluid intel­
ligence expressed by young adults (reflecting later 
generations). Even longitudinal results can be influ­
enced by these generational gains because longitudi­
nal data may be based on revised norms that reflect 
these generational gains, thereby producing what 
appears to be intellectual decline for older adults 
in fluid intelligence. These findings are consonant
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with the cohort effect uncovered by Schaie and oth­
ers (see Schaie, 1996, for a review).
Multidirectionality of abilities is also present in 
the distinction between the mechanics and prag­
matics of intelligence advanced by Baltes (1987; 
Baltes et al., 1998), which parallels the distinction 
between fluid and crystallized intelligence. In mak­
ing the analogy to a computer, Baltes et al. (1998) 
refer to these two aspects as the hardware (me­
chanics) versus the software (cognitive pragmatics) 
of the mind. The mechanics contain the basic in­
formation processing of the cognitive system, irre­
spective of the content of those processes, and are 
indexed by the speed and coordination of elemen­
tary processing operations such as might be assessed 
on tests of simple discrimination, selective atten­
tion, and so forth. The pragmatics of intelligence re­
fer to content-rich, experience-based declarative and 
procedural knowledge that one acquires during the 
course of socialization. As is true for the empirical 
findings on the distinction between fluid and crys­
tallized intelligence, Baltes et al. (1998) found that 
abilities representative of the mechanics of intelli­
gence declined linearly from young adulthood until 
old age, whereas abilities representative of the prag­
matics were stable throughout the adult years. For 
instance, no age differences were found on measures 
of reasoning about life planning (representative of 
pragmatics); however, linear decline was found in 
the speed of comparing information in short-term  
memory (representative of the mechanics of intelli­
gence).
2. INTERINDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY OF MEN­
TAL a b i l i t i e s . Variability in intellectual develop­
ment not only occurs for individuals across intel­
lectual abilities but for the same intellectual ability 
across individuals. That is, there is extensive in­
terindividual variability for a single intellectual abil­
ity within a specific age group. Although Schaie's 
(1996b) work consistently revealed mean cross­
sectional differences in overall performance, scores 
varied considerably within age group. Schaie (1988) 
explicitly studied this variability by examining the 
proportion of overlap in intellectual abilities with 
the distribution present for young adults (at age 25). 
Even in their late 80s, 53% of individuals overlapped 
with the distribution for young adults, thus scoring 
well above the mean for their age group on the ver­
bal meaning subtest (a measure of crystallized in­
telligence). Even in late life, therefore, a substantial 
proportion of individuals perform comparable to a 
group of young adults in measures of crystallized 
and fluid intelligence despite general age differences 
in mean levels of performance.
Variability also exists in the longitudinal patterns 
of decline, maintenance, and improvement that 
individuals demonstrate. Schaie and Willis (1986) 
found that by categorizing older individuals (mean 
age = 72 years) as having declined versus having re­
mained stable in their performance on the space and 
reasoning tests of the PMA over a 14-year period, 
the majority of individuals (46.7%) of the sample re­
mained stable on both measures, whereas only 21% 
declined in both measures. Schaie (1989) further re­
ports that even for those individuals who were fol­
lowed into their 80s, virtually no one showed uni­
versal declines across all five subtests of the PMA. 
An extensive body of research has now been com­
piled to understand what distinguishes individu­
als who show substantial intellectual decline from 
those who show maintenance and improvement in 
intellectual development. Schaie (1996b) found that 
individual differences in the developmental func­
tion of intelligence are due to a host of factors such 
as genetic endowment, incidence of chronic disease, 
educational background, occupational pursuits, the 
stimulating versus passive nature of daily life activi­
ties, and personality styles such as rigidity and flex­
ibility.
3 . p l a s t i c i t y  o f  m e n ta l  a b i l i t i e s .  Re­
search on the intraindividual plasticity of intelli­
gence has focused on the modifiability of intelli­
gence through intervention. Over the last two 
decades substantial research has revealed that inter­
vention can lead to significant gains in abilities such 
as problem-solving tasks (Denney, 1979), perceptual 
speed (Hoyer, Labouvie, & Baltes, 1973), and fluid 
intelligence (Baltes&Lindenberg, 1988; Willis, 1987). 
In general, intervention efforts have been aimed 
at those abilities that show the greatest decline: 
largely abilities of fluid intelligence and processes 
representative of the mechanics of intelligence.
Results from intervention studies indicate that the 
plasticity of human intelligence among older adults 
is substantial (see Willis, 1987 for a review). For in­
stance, results from the Seattle Training Study, a 
component of Schaie's Seattle Longitudinal Study 
(Schaie, 1996b) indicate that intervention boosted
IN T E L L E C T U A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  IN  A D U L T H O O D 123
older adults' performance back to the level present 
more than a decade before. Schaie and Willis trained 
Individuals in five 1-hour sessions in spatial ability 
or reasoning ability. For those who had show^, de­
cline in performance on either of these tests over 
the preceding 14-year period, training was effective 
in returning their performance nearly to the original 
level. For individuals who had remained stable over 
the preceding 14-year period, training raised their 
performance beyond the level they had demon­
strated 14 years previously. Not only is training ef­
fective in the short run, but gains produced through 
training are maintained over as many as 7 years 
(Neely & Backman, 1993; Willis & Nesselroade,
1990). However, training effects are fairly limited 
to tests in which training occurs and do not ex­
tend to intelligence tests that are different in kind 
(e.g., training in fluid intelligence tests does not 
extend to performance on crystallized intelligence 
tests, see Baltes & Willis, 1982).
ev er y d a y  in t e l l ig e n c e . Everyday intelli­
gence is an ability that has only recently been ex­
amined within the field of adult intelligence (see 
Berg & Klaczynski, 1996, for a review). The exami­
nation of everyday intelligence arose as researchers 
were concerned with using traditional tests of intel­
ligence (e.g., measures of fluid and crystallized 
intelligence) exclusively to measure the intelligence 
of adults who were largely outside of academic envi­
ronments. A variety of definitions and distinctions 
exist regarding the meaning of everyday intelli­
gence. Some define everyday intelligence as the 
expression of more basic fluid and crystallized abil­
ities that permit adaptive behavior within a specific 
class of everyday situations (Willis & Schaie, 1986). 
Many current definitions involve distinctions be­
tween abilities critical for everyday intelligence and 
abilities that are required to perform well on more 
traditional measures of intelligence (e.g., measures 
representative of fluid and crystallized intelligence) 
(Neisser, 1976; Wagner, 1986). Much of the measure­
ment of everyday intelligence has focused on solv­
ing problems that are ill-structured as to their goals 
and their solution (e.g., may not contain one correct 
answer) and that are frequently encountered in dai­
ly life (e.g., Cornelius is Caspi, 1987; Denney, 1989).
Everyday intelligence has been thought to be par­
ticularly important for measuring the intelligence of 
middle-aged and older adults, both by laypeople (see
earlier discussion of Berg & Sternberg, 1992) and the­
orists (Baltes et al., 1984; Berg, 1990; Sinnott, 1989). 
Everyday intelligence is thought to be used in indi­
viduals'work environments (Colonia-Willner, 1998; 
Wagner & Sternberg, 1985), in making routine de­
cisions (Johnson, 1990), in dealing with complex 
health decisions (Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995), and 
in solving tasks that are required to maintain in­
dependence (Willis & Schaie, 1993) in many daily 
life situations. Two issues have dominated work on 
everyday intelligence: ( 1) the extent to which every­
day intelligence is a manifestation of other more tra­
ditional intellectual abilities such as fluid and crys­
tallized intelligence, and (2 ) whether the pattern 
of age differences in everyday intelligence mirrors 
that of fluid or crystallized intelligence (see Berg is 
Klaczynski, 1996 for a review).
Research by Willis and her colleagues provides the 
best evidence that everyday intelligence is an ex­
pression of fluid and crystallized abilities. She ap­
proaches everyday intelligence as an adult's ability 
to perform activities considered essential for living 
independently (e.g., meal preparation, managing fi­
nances, using the telephone). Willis and colleagues 
utilized a variant of the ETS Basic Skills Test to mea­
sure everyday intelligence. This test is a multiple- 
choice test that contains items requiring individuals 
to read and abstract information from maps, medi­
cation labels, technical documents (e.g., IRS forms) 
and newspaper text. Such items have a single cor­
rect answer, are scored as either correct or incorrect, 
and are quite similar in their structure and format 
to traditional comprehension questions on intelli­
gence tests. Willis and Schaie (1986) reported sub­
stantial correlations between performance on the 
Basic Skills Test and a measure of fluid (r =  .83) and 
crystallized (r =  .78) intelligence. Diehl, Willis, and 
Schaie (1995) reported that measures of fluid intel­
ligence also predicted observational assessments of 
older adults that were designed to be variants of the 
paper and pencil measures.
Other researchers who have used more ill-struc­
tured measures of everyday intelligence have not 
found such strong evidence for the hierarchical na­
ture of intellectual abilities whereby everyday intel­
ligence is simply a manifestation of more traditional 
intellectual abilities, l or instance, many researchers 
utilize measures that involve presenting adults with 
hypothetical problem scenarios and asking the ex­
aminees to generate multiple strategies for problem
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solution (Denney & Palmer, 1981; Denney & Pearce, 
1989; Denney, Pearce, & Palmer, 1982) or rate the 
effectiveness of a preset group of strategies (e.g., 
Blanchard-Fields, Janke, & Camp, 1995; Cornelius & 
Caspi, 1987). For instance, adults might be pre­
sented with a problem involving how to fix one's 
broken lawnmower or with a decision-making task 
regarding which insurance plan to purchase. Stud­
ies using such measures have found only modest 
relationships (rs range between .2 and .4) between 
measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence and 
measures of everyday intelligence (Camp, Doherty, 
Moody-Thomas, & Denney, 1989; Cornelius & 
Caspi, 1987).
The developmental function of everyday intelli­
gence has been examined to determine if its di­
rection is more similar to the pattern uncovered 
for crystallized or fluid intelligence. The pattern of 
age differences in everyday intelligence varies dra­
matically, depending on the criterion used for op­
timal everyday problem-solving performance. For 
instance, Denney and her colleagues (Denney & 
Palmer, 1981; Denney & Pearce, 1989) used the 
number of "safe and effective solutions" generated 
and found that middle-aged adults generated the 
most number of solutions, whereas young and older 
adults produced fewer solutions. Berg et al. (1994) 
found no age differences when utilizing individu­
als' own ratings of how effective they were in solv­
ing their own everyday problems. Cornelius and 
Caspi (1987) found that everyday problem solv­
ing increased with adult age when the criterion of 
how closely individuals' ratings of strategy effective­
ness matched a "prototype" of the optimal everyday 
problem solver. Studies have also reported age differ­
ences in the strategies individuals report for dealing 
with everyday problems (more problem-focused or 
emotion-focused strategies), although inconsisten­
cies exist in the pattern of results (see Berg et al., 
1998, for a discussion), and disagreements occur as 
to whether a particular strategy type reflects more 
effective everyday problem solving (contrast Berg et 
al., 1998 with Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995); there­
fore, conclusions regarding the developmental func­
tion of strategy selection in'everyday problem solv­
ing are equivocal.
Several studies examining everyday problem solv­
ing within a neo-Piagetian or postformal operational 
perspective (extending and reformulating Piaget's 
theory to the study of adult development) have
also found evidence for growth in late adulthood 
(Labouvie-Vief, 1992). The formal operational rea­
soning of late adolescents and young adults, with 
its focus on logic, is replaced with more sophisti­
cated structures in middle and late adulthood that 
are characterized by more relativistic reasoning that 
involves a synthesis of logic, the irrational, emo­
tive, and personal. Blanchard-Fields, for instance, 
(1986, 1994; Blanchard-Fields & Norris, 1994) found 
evidence of increases in everyday intelligence in 
some conditions using measures that tap the ex­
tent of integrative attributional reasoning (integrat­
ing dispositional and situational components) in so­
cial dilemmas.
These inconsistencies in the relation between 
measures of everyday intelligence and fluid and 
crystallized intelligence and in the developmental 
function of everyday intelligence are probably due 
to multiple types of everyday intelligence being rep­
resented by these diverse measures. Marsiske and 
Willis (1995), which is the only work to date on 
the structure of everyday problem solving, indicated 
that different measures of everyday intelligence are 
indeed measuring distinct constructs, which are not 
highly related. In addition, the inconsistencies may 
be due to the fact that everyday problem-solving 
measures range from those that are quite similar in 
structure and format to traditional measures of in­
telligence (e.g., ETS Basic Skills Test) to those that 
diverge greatly from intelligence test items (e.g., ill- 
structured hypothetical problems characteristic of 
daily living). Such diverse measures may not be 
equally reflective of how individuals adapt to their 
everyday environments.
s u m m a r y . This review of the intellectual abili­
ties that individuals use to adapt to their context 
presents a fairly complex picture of adult intellectual 
development that emphasizes variability at multi­
ple levels of analysis. First, variability exists in the 
developmental function of intelligence, depending 
on the ability in question and the extent to which 
performance relies on accumulated experience and 
acculturation. Developmental differences are most 
prominent when assessed through abilities that re­
quire novel application (fluid intelligence) rather 
than familiar application (crystallized intelligence). 
Second, variability exists at any age between individ­
uals, and there is some evidence that this variabil­
ity is most prominent in late adulthood (see Morse,
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1993, for a review). Third, variability also exists at 
the intraindividual level, for intervention studies 
have shown great modifiability of individual abil­
ities at any age. Work on everyday intelligence re­
veals that this ability may show less decline across 
age than is present for fluid intelligence. The rela­
tion, however, between everyday intelligence and 
measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence de­
pends on the specific criterion used to assess every­
day intelligence.
Mental P ro ce sse s
Researchers who have examined the mental abil­
ities individuals use to adapt to their life contexts 
have focused on end products such as one’s per­
formance on an intelligence test. Those who have 
focused on mental processes, however, address the 
question of how those mental products are pro­
duced through mental processes.
The mental processes that individuals use to adapt 
to their contexts and how those mental processes 
change across development have largely been ad­
dressed from the information-processing perspec­
tive. The information-processing perspective focuses 
on the processes (e.g., representations, strategies, 
executive processes, availability of resources) by 
which an individual performs an intellectual task 
(Salthouse. 1992b). The focus is on how individuals 
mentally solve an intellectual task through basic- 
level processes of encoding, retrieving, and compar­
ing information, as well as higher order executive 
processes used to plan how to solve a problem and 
monitor one’s solution strategy. A key develop­
mental question within this perspective has been 
whether the age differences in mental abilities dis­
cussed previously can be isolated to particular pro­
cessing components or whether they are due to 
a limited number of mental resources that impact 
many mental processes.
lo c a liza tio n  of AGE-DIFFERENCES in p r o ­
cessing c o m po n en ts . The emphasis of much of 
the work examining age differences in mental pro­
cesses has been on localizing the specific processes 
responsible for the age differences seen in measures 
of fluid intelligence and understanding why those 
processes are intact with respect to crystallized per­
formance. Because many models of mental processes 
are represented by flowcharts that map the order of 
the processes, Salthouse (1992b) refers to these ef­
forts as identifying "which box is broken?"(p. 267).
These localization efforts begin by mapping out and 
measuring the cognitive processes that individuals 
go through when performing a specific task. In gen­
eral, researchers have assumed that the processes and 
strategies characterizing young adults' performance 
will also characterize older adults' performance, al­
though such an assumption may not always be valid 
(see Adams, Labouvie-Vief, Hobart, 6c Dorosz, 1990; 
Berg, Klaczynski, Calderone, is Strough, 1994).
In mapping age differences in processes, no age 
differences have been found in individuals' meta- 
cognitive abilities. The term metacognitive abilities 
refers to individuals’ knowledge about memory or 
cognition (e.g., relative difficulty of remembering 
different types of information) and individuals'abil­
ity to monitor their own cognitive processes (al­
locating time to smdy material not yet mastered, 
accurate judgements concerning cognitive perfor­
mance). No age differences have been found in 
either type of metacognitive abilities (Cavanaugh, 
1996; Hultsch is Dixon, 1990). Thus, older individu­
als are aware of their own cognitive functioning and 
are able to monitor its functioning as well as young 
adults.
However, age differences have been found in 
many other processing components to such an ex­
tent that some have concluded it may not be fruit­
ful to isolate which of the "boxes'' or components is 
broken or deficient. For example, research examin­
ing age differences in spatial visualization (see space 
subtest of PMA, Figure 6.1), a measure of fluid in­
telligence, typically shows age-related declines be­
ginning in the 30s (see Figure 6.2). Numerous at­
tempts were made by investigators to localize which 
process is responsible for these age differences. This 
work drew on models of mental rotations ability de­
veloped by Shephard and Metzler (1971) that spec­
ify processes involved in the successful completion 
of mental rotations items. These processes include a 
serial order of processing stages beginning with en­
coding the stimuli followed by an analog mental ro­
tation of the stimuli into congruence, comparisons 
of the representations, and finally a motor response. 
Numerous studies (Berg, Hertzog, & Hunt, 1982; 
Cerella, Poon, is Fozard, 1981; Gaylord & Marsh, 
1975; Hertzog, Vernon, & Rypma, 1993) reported 
that older adults were slower in each of the men­
tal processes (e.g., encoding, rotating, comparing, 
deciding) than young adults. Thus, age differences 
could not be localized to any one particular process.
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T h e results from  w ork w ith  th e spatial visual­
ization  test is co n so n a n t w ith a large body of re­
search th at tries to  localize age differences in a wide 
variety  of abilities such  as reason in g and m em ory  
(Salthonse, 1 9 9 1 ) . T hese failures to  isolate th e sm all 
nu m b er of processing com p o n en ts  responsible for 
age-related  differences in fluid intelligence perfor­
m a n ce  led m an y th eorists to  speculate th a t a sm aller 
nu m b er o f processing resources are responsible for 
th e large num ber of differences seen in processing  
co m p o n e n ts  (see Figure 6 .3 ). Thus, th e  processing  
resources view has been gain in g support as a m ore  
p arsim on iou s exp lan atio n  of intellectual d evelop ­
m e n t th a n  th e localization  ap p roach .
p ro c e s s in g  r e s o u r c e s .  Two processing re­
sources have been m ost frequently postulated and  
investigated  as responsible for age-related differ­
en ces in processing co m p o n en ts: speed of p ro ­
cessing an d  w orking m em ory  capacity  (Saithouse,
FIGURE 6.3. Schematic illustration of the difference between 
the localization approach and the reduced resources ap­
proach to cognitive aging itaken from Saithouse, 199U
1 9 9 1 ). Interestingly, these p rocessing resources h ave  
also been  theorized to  be responsible for age-related  
chan ges in processing co m p o n e n ts  during child ­
h ood  and ad olescen ce (Case et al„ 1 9 9 6 ; Kail, 1 9 9 1 ;  
Saithouse & Kail, 1 9 8 3 ).
1, Speed o f processing. The idea that speed of process­
ing may be a resource responsible for age-related dif­
ferences in processing com ponents com es from re­
search showing that older adults' perform ance across 
a wide variety of tasks slows at similar rates (Birren, 
1974). Several meta-analyses of young and older 
adults' perform ance suggest that older adults' perfor­
m ance on a wide variety of tasks with diverse proce­
dures slows at a fairly constant function of young  
adults’ perform ance (Cerella, 1990; Hale, Myerson, 
Smith, & Poon, 1988). Several large-scale studies 
have been conducted to exam ine the role of speed 
of processing in age differences in measures of fluid 
intelligence (Hertzog, 1989; Saithouse, Kausler, & 
Saults, 1988).
For instance, Saithouse et al. (1988) examined  
speed of processing (measured by the time needed 
to make relatively simple comparisons) and its in­
fluence on measures of fluid intelligence (e.g., series 
com pletion, geom etric analogies, and spatial reason­
ing tasks). Depending on the specific measure used 
to indicate processing speed, between 13 and 32%  
of the age differences in measures of cognitive per­
form ance were associated with age differences in 
speed. M uch higher estimates of the age-related vari­
ance in cognitive perform ance that is attributable 
to processing speed com e from a study by HeTtzog 
(1989). He found that controlling for measures of 
speed of processing (operationalized as perceptual 
speed, tasks such as number com parison, and find­
ing As in a string of letters) in the performance of 
other cognitive tasks reduced the age-related vari­
ance in cognitive perform ance by an average of 92%. 
The results from a large num ber of studies (see Salt- 
house, 1992a , for a review) now provide moderate 
support for speed of processing as a resource respon­
sible for som e of the age-related differences in cog­
nitive tasks.
2 . Working memory capacity. Working m em ory capac­
ity is a processing resource th at has often been pos­
tulated as responsible for the age differences found 
in processing com ponents. Working m em ory capac­
ity refers to the am ount of inform ation that can
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he stored and processed in a sort of mental scratch 
pad used when performing nearly every cognitive 
task. Age differences in working memory capacity 
have been implicated in age differences in nearly 
every type of mental ability: language and compre­
hension (Cohen, 1988; McDowd, Oseas-Kreger, is 
Filion, 1995; Hasher & Zacks, 1988) and spatial re­
lations and abstract reasoning (Saithouse, Mitchell, 
Skovronek. & Babcock, 1989).
Numerous studies have explored whether age dif­
ferences in working memory are associated with 
age differences in cognitive performance (e.g., 
Saithouse, 1992a; Saithouse, Mitchell, Skovronek, & 
Babcock, 1989). Saithouse (1992a) had subjects from 
18 to 83 years of age perform the computation span 
and a variety of fluid intelligence tasks such as the 
Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices, the Shipley 
Abstraction Test, paper folding, integrative reason­
ing, geometric analogies, and cube assembly. In the 
computation span task, participants were presented 
with a series of simple arithmetic problems in which 
they are asked to indicate the correct answer and 
to remember the final digit in each of the problems 
and respond accordingly at the end. The results from 
these studies indicate that working memory is asso­
ciated with about 50% of the age-related variance 
in measures of cognitive functioning. Thus, working 
memory can be viewed as an important mediator of 
the age-related differences in many measures of cog­
nitive function (Saithouse, 1991 ,1992a, for reviews).
Sum m ary
The review of the mental processes that adults use 
to perform intelligence tasks indicates that age dif­
ferences exist in several mental processes. Current 
thinking within the field indicates that the age dif­
ferences found in many mental processes may be 
due to age differences in two processing resources: 
speed of response and working memory capacity. A 
substantial body of evidence is now accumulating 
that indicates that these two processing resources 
may be responsible for a substantial portion of the 
age-related variance in mental abilities or products.
CONTEXT OF ADULT 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
The preceding review has focused on characteristics 
within the individual (abilities and processes) that
researchers believe are utilized as individuals adapt 
to their contexts across development. Although 
intelligence is viewed in this chapter as the men­
tal abilities and processes whereby individuals adapt 
to multiple contexts, the literature thus far has not 
examined the process of adaptation. Rather, the lit­
erature has focused on the fact that abilities and 
mental components may be differently expressed in 
multiple contexts. Although the research reviewed 
portrays a view ol the context as setting up specific 
constraints and opportunities to which the individ­
ual passively adapts, the view taken in the chapter is 
not as unidirectional or passive as it may seem. That 
is, individuals do not passively apply their abilities 
and processes to static contexts that contain differ­
ent opportunities and constraints. Rather the adap­
tation process is a dynamic one in which the indi­
vidual’s abilities and processes as well as the context 
are simultaneously shaped and altered.
The theoretical perspective that has most often 
been used to understand the context of adult in­
telligence is the contextualist perspective (Berg & 
Calderone, 1994; Berg is Sternberg, 1985; Dixon,
1992). Such a perspective defines intellectual de­
velopment as reflecting the specific contexts -  
sociocultural, biological, and historical -  in which 
development occurs (Laboratory of Comparative 
Human Cognition, 1982; Rogoff, 1982; Vygotsky, 
1978). From this perspective intellectual develop­
ment is examined as occurring within different 
contexts. That is, intellectual development is posited 
to be disparate across groups of individuals who are 
situated in different contexts. To the extent that 
contextual demands and opportunities are different 
across the adult life span, different measurements of 
intelligence may be needed.
Although extensive studies detailing the context 
of adult intelligence at different times during de­
velopment have not been conducted, much spec­
ulation has occurred as to how the landscape and 
context of adults across the life span vary in a way 
that influences intellectual development. The con­
text of older adults differs from that of young adults 
in many ways. The proximity of older adults to 
formal schooling environments is much less than 
that of young adults who recently completed high 
school or are currently enrolled in college. Many 
fewer older adults are in daily contact with the work 
context, due to retirement, as compared with young
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adults. Older adults differ from young adults in the 
complexity versus passivity of their daily life activ­
ities, which may be important for sustaining intel­
lectual functioning (Scheldt & Schaie, 1978). Older 
adults may also differ from young adults in the fre­
quency of social interaction (Antonncci & Akiyama,
1987), which may affect opportunities for collabo­
rative problem solving.
For instance, as individuals move from young 
adulthood to late adulthood, there is a move away 
from contact with formal schooling environments. 
Differences in the number of years of education 
and the type of educational experiences that these 
years represent have been examined as an impor­
tant factor in understanding cohort effects (Schaie, 
1996a). In addition, Rogoff's(1982) treatment of the 
influence of formal schooling on cognitive perfor­
mance suggests that intellectual performance may 
be influenced because most adults are not in for­
mal schooling environments. The memorization, 
categorization, and speed of response required in 
most Western schools have been found to influence 
many aspects of cognitive performance, including 
spontaneous use of strategies to remember infor­
mation, abstract reasoning, and the ability to draw 
formal logical conclusions (Laboratory of Compar­
ative Cognition, 1982; Rogoff, 1982), In fact, com­
parisons of young and older adults who are both 
in formal schooling environments often show re­
duced or no age differences in intellectual perfor­
mance (Jacewicz & Hartley, 1979; Parks, Mitchell, & 
Per I mutter, 1986), although interpretations of these 
data are complex.
Research on the context of adult intellectual de­
velopment is in its relative infancy compared with 
work on the individual abilities and processes that 
reside within the individual. Research will next 
be reviewed illustrating two issues that have been 
prominent thus far in this work: (1) how intellec­
tual development varies across different contexts 
and (2) how the social context may facilitate intel­
lectual performance.
variability  in intellectu al D evelopm ent 
a c ro s s  D ifferent C o n tex ts  ‘
Research that examines how individuals adapt 
their mental abilities and processes to fit the spe­
cific contextual constraints and opportunities of 
the context and correspondingly shape their con­
texts to provide a better fit with their mental needs 
has largely been conducted for adults by focusing 
on only one specific age group (e.g., Lave, 1989; 
Scribner, 1986). For instance, Scribner (1986) found 
that adult dairy workers adapted their arithmetic 
strategies depending on the specific constraints of 
the size of boxes and number of bottles involved 
in the delivery order. Much less work has been 
done, however, comparing adults across the life span 
in the ways in which abilities and processes are 
adapted to fit contextual conditions. The research 
reviewed typically compares individuals of different 
ages who occupy disparate contexts to understand 
how contextual demands may reflect different in­
tellectual abilities and processes rather than focus­
ing on the same individuals and how they respond 
to different contexts.
COMPLEXITY OF WORK ENVIRONMENTS. One
environmental variable that has been examined as 
being influential for shaping the development of 
adult intelligence is the complexity and stimulation 
of one's work environment. Kohn and Schooler 
(1983) examined the relation between the extent to 
which one's work-related activities involve inde­
pendent thought and judgment (which they call 
sub stantive complexity) and ideational flexibility 
(a combined measure of fluid intelligence tests and 
responses to questions representing flexibility in 
dealing with complex intellectual activities). Results 
from their longitudinal study of men between the 
ages of 24 to 64 years of age indicate that the more 
substantive the complexity of one's job, the greater 
the incremental gains in intellectual performance 
over a 10-year period. The same relations between job 
complexity and intelligence hold for women doing 
complex housework (Schooler, 1984). Furthermore, 
Miller and Kohn (1983) found that individuals with 
greater ideational flexibility were involved in more 
intellectually engaging leisure activities (e.g., read­
ing books versus watching television). Although 
these studies suggest that a complex work environ 
ment assists in maintaining intellectual function­
ing, these studies are unable to rule out the possibil­
ity that individuals who maintain their intellectual 
functioning are more apt to pursue and stay in chal­
lenging work environments. However, these results 
are consistent with those of researchers (Gribbin, 
Schaie, & Parham, 1980; Huistch, Hammer, & Small,
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN ADULTHOOD 129
1993) who found that engaging in more complex 
and stimulating daily life activities is related to 
modest facilitation of intellectual performance.
DOMAIN OF EVERYDAY PROBLEM  SO LV IN G . A 
growing literature now exists that demonstrates 
that everyday intelligence is different when ex­
amined within different domains of functioning 
(Berg et al., 1998; Blanchard-Fields, Chen, & Norris, 
1997; Cornelius & Caspi, 1987). The domain of 
everyday intelligence is used to refer to the con­
text in which problems occur (e.g., school, work, 
home) and the types of demands present in problem 
contexts (e.g., interpersonal versus achievement). 
Sansone and Berg (1993) reported that the context 
of everyday intelligence differs across the life span 
such that domains of work and family are particu­
larly salient during middle adulthood and domains 
such as family and health are more salient in late 
adulthood. Contextual differences are thought to 
be important in understanding developmental dif­
ferences in everyday problem solving because de­
velopmental differences may reflect the reality that 
individuals occupy different contexts and thereby 
experience disparate problems across the life span. 
Berg et al. (1998) and Blanchard-Fields et al. (1997) 
found that the strategies adults used to deal with 
everyday problem-solving situations and the attri­
butions they made for the behavior of individu­
als within the problem varied depending on the 
context in which everyday problems were couched. 
For instance, individuals reported utilizing strategies 
that were more interpersonally focused for more in- 
terpersonallv relevant domains such as family and 
friends and strategies that were focused more on be­
havioral action for more achievement-oriented do­
mains (Berg et al., 1998). Berg et al. (1998) reported 
that these context effects may have been observed 
because different contexts elicit different represen­
tations of problem situations and goal orientations, 
which subsequently influence strategy selection.
FA M ILIARITY OR EX PER IEN C E W IT H  TH E  DO­
MAIN. Individual differences in the familiarity of 
young and older adults with the materials and con­
text of intellectual assessment have also been exam­
ined. Familiarity and experience with the contexts 
°f intellectual assessment are important because in­
dividuals may express their abilities and mental pro­
cesses differently when they are familiar with the 
constraints and opportunities of the context ver­
sus when they are unfamiliar with these features. 
Cornelius (1984) reported that older adults per­
ceived traditional intelligence tests as less familiar 
than did young adults. Thus, comparisons of young 
and older adults on intelligence tests may place 
older adults at a relative disadvantage because they 
may be less familiar with how to apply their mental 
processes and products in specific intellectual assess­
ment contexts.
Results have clearly shown that intellectual per­
formance is superior for both young and older adults 
when assessed in contexts that are familiar to indi­
viduals -  either when individuals are given mate­
rials with which they are familiar (Smith & Baltes,
1990) or when individuals are given extensive prac­
tice with the intellectual task (Berg et al., 1982). The 
research has been equivocal, however, as to whether 
differential familiarity is a factor that can help to ex­
plain age differences in intellectual performance.
Several studies now have examined the problem­
solving performance of young and older adults with 
problems that were constructed to be more famil­
iar or more normative for one age group or the 
other. Smith and Baltes (1990) found that adults per­
formed best on measures of wisdom when the prob­
lems were more normative for the examinee's age 
group. Denney and colleagues also found that adults 
performed best when presented everyday problems 
more normative for their age group (Denney et al.,
1982). However, Denney and Pearce (1989) found 
that familiar materials were not able to eliminate 
age differences in that older adults performed less 
well than young adults even when older adults were 
performing with materials that had been explicitly 
designed by older adults to be those with which 
they would perform better than young adults. Re­
search examining how memory performance is fa­
cilitated by familiar materials is consistent (Barrett & 
Watkins, 1986; Worden & Sherman-Brown, 1983) 
in showing that older adults tend to perform bet­
ter with materials with which they are more familiar 
(e.g., remembering words that were in frequent use 
during their adulthood years versus contemporary 
equivalents).
Another strategy for examining the role of fa­
miliarity with the abilities and operations under
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examination has been to assess intellectual func­
tioning in areas of relative expertise versus less ex­
pertise (see Bosman & Charness, 1996; Salthouse, & 
Mitchell 1990). This research has focused on how 
extensive amounts of practice, as would character­
ize individuals who practice some ability or pro­
cess daily in their jobs (e.g., typists and reaction 
time) may alter the typical declines seen in mea­
sures of intellectual performance. Domain-relevant 
performance in which individuals have had exten­
sive experience (e.g., chess and bridge experts, ar­
chitects and their spatial ability, typists) tends to 
show a developmental trajectory of maintenance, 
whereas what appears to be the same process or 
ability assessed in a less familiar or contextualized 
fashion may demonstrate a trajectory of decline 
(Charness, 1981; Salthouse, 1984). For instance, 
Salthouse (1984) reported that typists varying in age 
showed the typical declines in speed of performance 
when assessed via a reaction-time task but did not 
show any age-related declines in speed of process­
ing when typing. The maintenance of speed of pro­
cessing with familiar materials appeared to be due 
to older adults’ adopting a different strategy for typ­
ing than young adults. Thus, older adults may have 
compensated for some declines in intellectual func­
tioning by adapting their cognitive strategies to fit 
optimally with the typing task. Research that exam­
ines familiarity with materials by giving individuals 
extensive practice with some task, however, does not 
often fully eliminate age differences and sometimes 
shows an exacerbation of age differences (see Berg 
et al., 1982; Denney, 1979). Thus, extensive prac­
tice may be required before individuals are able to 
fit their abilities and processes optimally to the con­
straints of the intellectual context.
Social Context o f Adult Intellectual 
D evelopm ent
Recently, several investigators have examined the 
social context of adult intellectual development (see 
Baltes & Staudinger, 1996b, for a review). This work 
emphasized how the process of adapting to one's en­
vironment may involve other individuals as collab­
orators, support providers, and sources of informa­
tion (see also Berg, Meegan, & Deviney, 1998; Berg 
et al., 1998). Schaie's (1996b) analyses of adult mar­
ried couples suggests that one’s spouse may serve as 
an important collaborator. His work indicates that
individuals' intellectual performance benefits from 
having a spouse who is performing better than one­
self intellectually.
Work within the social context of intelligence 
questions the typical view of intelligence as resid­
ing within an individual's mind and instead begins 
to talk about constructs such as interactive minds 
(Baltes & Staudinger, 1996a) and the sociocultural 
mind (Rogoff, 1990) to illustrate the transactive na­
ture of minds. Baltes and Staudinger (1996a) charac­
terized interactive minds as implying
that the acquisition and manifestation of individual 
cognitions influence and are influenced by cognitions 
of others and that these reciprocal influences between 
minds contribute to the activation and modification of 
already available cognitions as well as to the generation 
(development) of new ones (p. 7)
Several studies now point to the important role 
that others play in the process whereby individ­
uals use their mental processes and abilities to 
adapt to their context. Staudinger and Baltes (1996; 
Staudinger, 1996) have examined the social con­
text of wisdom. Wisdom is operationalized as exper­
tise in knowledge of the fundamental pragmatics of 
life. Their measure of wisdom taps the pragmatics of 
intelligence and involves problems that describe a 
difficult life-planning scenario (e.g., a middle-aged 
woman who desires to pursue career and educa­
tional opportunities for herself at a time when her 
adult son needs assistance with rearing his young 
children). Individuals are asked to solve this prob­
lem, and their responses are coded for the amount of 
procedural and factual knowledge individuals men­
tion, an understanding of the contextual complexi­
ties present in the solution, a person's management 
of uncertainty, and so forth. Staudinger and Baltes 
examined the ability of individuals to solve life- 
planning problems under several conditions that 
varied the extent of social interaction. Anchoring 
the individual end of assessment was the typical 
form of assessment in which an individual was asked 
to perform the task alone. A condition designed 
to elicit a moderate amount of social facilitation 
was a condition in which individuals were asked 
to think about the task when informed by what 
another person, whose advice he or she typically 
seeks, would encourage them to consider. The great­
est facilitation was expected when an individual was
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allowed to discuss the task with another person and 
then respond individually. The results indicated that 
the best performance occurred when individuals 
worked in dyads and when working with the im­
plied other (these conditions were not different from 
each other). Working individually (the typical form 
of assessment) was particularly ineffective compared 
with these other conditions. Thus, individuals' per­
formance can benefit from face-to-face interaction 
with others as well as implied interaction.
Research by Dixon and colleagues further suggests 
the process whereby social facilitation may occur. 
For instance, Dixon and Gould (1996) examined 
the text recall of young and older married couples. 
Dixon and Gould (1996) and Gould, Kurzman, and 
Dixon (1994) found that older married couples per­
formed as well as younger married couples on mea­
sures of amount of information recalled (in direct 
opposition to a large body of research, see Hultsch & 
Dixon, 1990). When the interaction patterns be­
tween husbands and wives were examined, older 
couples appeared to engage in more strategy discus­
sion at a point when text recall was declining to 
a greater extent than did young adults. Dixon and 
Gould (1996) interpreted such results to mean that 
older adults may be compensating for their declines 
in individual recall through strategies that may elicit 
more text recall. Older married adults may be more 
able to engage in such strategies than young couples 
because of their extensive relational history (Berg 
et al„ 1998).
The research on the social facilitation of intellec­
tual performance has implications for older adults' 
collaborative problem solving in numerous tasks of 
everyday intelligence (e.g., calculating taxes, deci­
sions regarding retirement planning, difficult med­
ical decisions). Furthermore, this work is sugges­
tive of a different type of intellectual assessment. 
For instance, Vygotsky's (1978) work suggests that 
the difference between individual performance and 
what an individual accomplishes with the assis­
tance of others could be used as a measure of in­
tellectual competence rather than individual perfor­
mance alone. This zone is thought to reflect latent 
potential or soon-to-be developing competence. Al­
though Brown and Ferrara (1985) suggested that 
such a form of intellectual assessment may be useful 
across the life span, this form of assessment has not 
Vet been adopted in the field.
Summary
The research reviewed illustrates the powerful role 
of the context in affecting the expression of intel­
lectual abilities and processes and in potentially al­
tering the course of intellectual development. Al­
though the research in this area is still growing, 
the research suggests that intellectual development 
varies according to the complexity of one's daily life 
context and that the familiarity, content, and social 
nature of one's context influence the expression of 
many abilities and processes.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This chapter has painted a complex and rich view of 
the potential changes that occur across adult devel­
opment in intelligence. The three perspectives (psy­
chometric, information-processing, and contextual) 
utilized to review work oriented toward the view of 
intelligence as comprising abilities and processes sit­
uated in context each add an important, if not es­
sential, dimension of intellectual functioning. The 
psychometric perspective begins by surveying the 
landscape of intelligence with a focus on intellectual 
products throughout the life course. From this per­
spective we see the variability that exists across dif­
ferent intellectual abilities, within an ability across 
persons, and within a specific individual across 
intervention. The information-processing perspec­
tive endeavors to understand the processes by which 
intellectual products are formed by examining the 
processes, representations, and strategies individu­
als use to perform specific intellectual tasks. Age dif­
ferences in processes may well be due to more gen­
eral processing resources (e.g.. speed of processing 
and working memory capacity) that underlie many- 
intellectual performances. The contextual perspec­
tive takes the intellectual products and processes in­
vestigated by the first two perspectives and places 
these in a larger sociocultural context. The complex­
ity, familiarity, domain, and social nature of the con­
text have influences on the form and content, as 
well as the quality, of the intellectual products and 
processes.
This chapter illustrates how research within the 
field of adult intellectual development has largely 
focused separately on the abilities and processes
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that reside within the mind of the individual or 
on the differential expression of abilities and pro­
cesses within different contexts, within rather dif­
ferent theoretical perspectives. However, as should 
be clear from the review, any measurement of intel­
lectual performance draws on abilities and processes 
and is assessed within a context that has particular 
constraints and opportunities. Thus, we could re­
frame any of the research reviewed on any partic­
ular aspect of intelligence (e.g., abilities) and recast 
it as involving the other aspects of intelligence. For 
instance, research that examines age-related differ­
ences in measures of fluid intelligence has typically 
been framed as demonstrating age-related decline in 
basic-level abilities for which prior education and ac­
culturation are of relatively little advantage. How­
ever, within the view of intelligence taken within 
this chapter, these age differences may be under­
stood as showing age-related differences in process­
ing resources expressed within an environment (the 
typical testing situation) that is less familiar to older 
adults than to young adults and that contains cer­
tain demands (e.g., highly speeded responses in an 
environment that is asocial). Too often work that 
is focused on a specific component of intelligence 
(e.g., context) neglects how other aspects of intelli­
gent functioning may be involved (abilities or pro­
cesses). A more complete, albeit complex, view of 
intelligence would emerge if research were oriented 
toward understanding all three of these aspects of 
intelligent performance (i.e., abilities, processes, and 
contexts) across adult development.
The view of intelligence advanced in this chap­
ter as the m ental abilities and processes th a t an in­
dividual uses to f it optim ally w ith  his or her context 
suggests, however, another avenue for research that 
focuses specifically on the process of adaptation. 
Because the contexts to which adaptation is directed 
differ across adult development, individuals must 
adapt their own mental abilities and processes to fit 
with the changing context and correspondingly to 
change the context to fit one's own mental abili­
ties and processes better. However, as is illustrated 
herein, individuals' abilities and processes as well as 
their context are dynamically changing across adult 
development.
Research is needed that specifically addresses how 
individuals adapt to these changing abilities, pro­
cesses, and contexts. For instance, research could ex­
amine how adults' mental abilities and processes are 
adapted in the face of contextual changes such as 
changing jobs, retirement, or loss of spouse (as po­
tential collaborative partner) and correspondingly 
how individuals change their contexts to adapt to 
these demands (e.g., change job requirements to fit 
better with one's own needs, use friends as collab­
orators after the loss of a spouse). Furthermore, re­
search must explore how individuals' awareness of 
changes in their own abilities and processes (e.g., 
speed of response, fluid intelligence) may foster 
cognitive adaptations such as compensations (e.g., 
Backman & Dixon, 1992) or contextual adaptations 
such as the use of memory aids or switching con­
texts (Dixon, 1992). Such research might explore 
how these adaptations take place during naturally 
occurring transitions and changes in contexts and 
abilities and processes as well as more experimen­
tally controlled changes.
Multiple models of life-course change can be use­
ful in guiding these research efforts. For instance, 
R B. Baltes and M. Baltes' (1984) model of selec­
tive optimization with compensation addresses how 
individuals may consciously select out of contexts 
perceived to be inconsistent with current cognitive 
needs and into others that optimize fit. Backman 
and Dixon (1992) used the notion of compensation 
to understand how individuals may alter cognitive 
abilities and processes when a mismatch is perceived 
to occur between the individual and environmental 
demands. Brandtstadter and Greve's (1994) model of 
the self explores how individuals may change their 
intellectual goals to provide a more optimal fit be­
tween changing abilities, processes, and contexts. 
These models place the individual in an important 
role as regulator of his or her own life-span intellec­
tual development. The self-regulatory process sug­
gested by these models is in need of explicit empiri­
cal examination.
As research begins to examine this process where­
by mental processes and abilities are adapted to pro­
vide an optimal fit to specific contexts, research will 
need to examine how factors that have not tradi­
tionally been examined as relevant for intelligence 
(e.g., personality, attitudes, stress, and coping strate­
gies) may influence this adaptation process. Numer­
ous personality correlates over the years have been 
identified with intellectual functioning. Modest 
relationships have been found between in tellectual
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functioning and perceptions of efficacy (Lachman & 
Leff, 1989), attitudes toward aging (Levy, 1996), and 
personality styles of rigidity and flexibility (Schaie, 
1996b). Such personality characteristics have re­
cently been incorporated into ideas about adult 
Intelligence (Ackerman, 1996; Sternberg & Ruzgis,
1994). The integration of social, emotional, and 
cognitive factors in understanding intellectual de­
velopment in adulthood has been underscored in 
neo-Piagetian models of intellectual development 
(labouvie-Vief, 1992).
To conclude, the answer to the question of what 
happens to intelligence across adulthood is a com­
plex one, which includes many qualifiers. The form 
of intellectual development depends on what one 
means by intelligence (i.e., what abilities are un­
der consideration, the processes that are required by 
the intellectual performance) and on aspects of the 
context in which the performance occurs. Further­
more, the factors that influence intellectual devel­
opment may differ for individuals whose contexts 
present different intellectual demands. Thus, both 
White and Channing (quoted at the beginning of 
the chapter) are correct in their characterization of 
adult intellectual development. It includes both the 
decline in quickness and memory and the growth 
of synthetic understanding of self and others that 
White and Channing described. The challenge for 
the future of the field of adult intelligence is how 
to incorporate these views of losses and gains into 
a vision of adult intelligence as optimally transact­
ing the contexts of life. This future must include an 
understanding of how individuals incorporate and 
manage these gains and losses in the regulation of 
their own intellectual development.
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